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Abstract: The central bank is the highest monetary authority within each monetary system. 
This is why the concern for the responsibilities, objectives and functions of central banks is 
present in the general economy field, as well as in those of finance, currency or financial 
exchange relations. Therefore, a contrasted analysis between the Eurosystem, the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Japan is of general interest for the users. The paper presents a 
comparison between the three systems. The status and objective differences are presented with a 
reference to the historical circumstances that have generated national characteristics. In the past 
years, due to the fact that all the three authorities have made directional changes towards 
independence and transparency, and because the economies of these areas are mainly 




The Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan are the most important 
monetary authorities in the world. The idea of comparing these systems is not unique; it 
has always been the concern of many economists, some of them having a direct 
connection to bank activity, others as external analysts. Even so, we consider the 
subject to be of interest as the study is a direct comparison of the three monetary 
authorities in what regards the organization and the monetary policy instruments used. 
The Eurosystem was established in 1998, the Federal Reserve - the central bank of 
the United States (Fed) in 1914, while BoJ- the Bank of Japan – in 1882. It can be 
noticed a difference of over one hundred years between the Japanese monetary 
authority and the Eurosystem. But it is not time that brought the most significant 
differences, even if the structures and the organization of these three systems mirror 
different historical circumstances and specific national characteristics. While the legal 
status and some of their duties differ to some extent, there are, in fact, few differences 
regarding institutional structures, the monetary policy framework and its goal. There are 
many factors that played an important role in reducing the differences between these 
monetary institutions - the three most important in the world.  
One of the factors is that central banks practices evolved in the same direction: 
great independence, transparency and the establishment of monetary policy committees. 
This lead to the decrease of distinctions between these three institutions, a tendency to 
be noted in other central banks as well. Nevertheless, there still remain differences in 
the way monetary policy committees operate.  
Another factor that also contributed to the decrease of differences between 
Eurosystem, Fed and BoJ is the convergence of the indicators from the economic and 
financial environment. From 1980 to 2004 the inflation rate in the United States 517 
remained within a narrow range, while the euro zone had a continually decreasing 
tendency and, before the euro currency release, it reached levels consistent with those 
of the United States. After 1980, Japan reached a low level of inflation. Concerning the 
economic development, it can be said that both Fed and BoJ operate in a harmonious 
economic and financial environment. 
There are several differences relating to the strategies of information 
communication, although financial markets are influenced by both Eurosystem and 
Fed’s statements. A major difference resides from the fact that, unlike ECB and BoJ, 
Fed does not quantify its price stability goal and does not communicate a constant 
monetary policy. Other distinctions occur in public relations: ECB, the European 
Central Bank, does not publish the minutes of the Governing Council meetings, but 
offers real-time information on interest rate modifications. 
 
Monetary Policy Objectives 
The Maastricht treaty establishes that “the first objective of ESCB shall be to 
maintain price stability” and “without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the [European] Community with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the [European] 
Community”. Thus the treaty sets a clear hierarchy of the ECB and assigns cardinal 
importance to price stability. Moreover, ECB openly quantified price stability.  
The well defined ESBC goal is in clear contrast with the multiple objectives set to 
Fed. In a Fed report it is set that “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) shall maintain long run 
growth of the economy so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” (Federal Reserve 
Act, Section 2A.1) 
Even so, many analysts consider that, although The US Congress did not explicitly 
commission the Fed to pursue low inflation, it still tries to inform the public about the 
advantages of low inflation and the need to give priority to this objective. It must be 
said that in the past years, although the Fed had many objectives to reach, the accent 
was set on price stability maintenance.  
Concerning Boj, its main monetary policy goal is price stability maintenance and 
the second is that of providing an accessible and stable payment and settlement system. 
Both objectives are oriented towards financial system stability, setting the basis for 
economic development. On March 9
th, 2006, BoJ introduced a new monetary policy 
framework, reviewing its opinion on price stability with a view to providing an 
adequate environment for economic development. 
 
The independence of the central banks 
In many countries, the gradual process of responsibility delegation from a single 
central bank to a monetary committee coincided with central bank’s independence 
acknowledgement (Blinder, 2004).  Central bank independence is a stratified concept, 
having several components: 
•  personal independence: refers to the role, status and composition of the highest 
management bodies of the central bank, including position assignment procedures for 
the members of the respective bodies, revocation rules, mandate period and renewal 
possibility, professional competency requirements, incongruity clause and interest 
conflicts.  518 
•  financial independence: takes into account the separation of government funds 
from those of the central bank. 
•  functional independence, also known as political independence, refers to 
decision making and monetary policy implementation autonomy. 
Article 108 of the European treaty establishes that the Eurosystem is politically 
independent. First of all, the financial interests of the ECB are separated from those of 
the European Community. ECB has its own funds and its capital is subscribed and paid 
by national central banks in the euro zone. Secondly, a potential political influence on 
the ECB’ individual members is minimal: the Governing Council have relatively long 
term mandates, while a rule reads that the members of the Executive Committee cannot 
be reelected. Thirdly, the independence of the Eurosystem is strengthened by the 
interdiction to give credits to the public sector. Finally, the Eurosystem has a functional 
independence, as well, as ECB has all the instruments and competences to manage the 
monetary policy and is authorized to independently decide how and when to use them. 
Although the Fed has greater independence, it was discussed that it is somehow 
lesser than that of the Eurosystem. The Constitution of the United States gives the 
Congress the right “to coin money and regulate the value thereof”. The Congress 
delegated this responsibility to the Fed, but in theory, it could abrogate it at any time. 
Still, the enactment by the Congress of a special resolution in favour of the Fed (Federal 
Reserve Act) proves the clear intention of separating state and monetary policies. There 
are a number of provisions conceived to protect the independence of the Fed. For 
instance, Fed is independent from other Government agencies and branches, it is 
financed from its own funds, and therefore there is no relation to the budgetary process. 
The terms of the seven Board of Governors members last for 14 years, at the most, so 
they cover several presidential and Congress mandates. There is a connection between 
the two authorities: the members of the management body of the Fed are appointed and 
approved by the Congress. The president and vice-president of the Board are elected by 
the President of the United States among the existing governors and the election must 
be approved by the Senate. They have four-years terms and can be reelected before the 
end of their term. 
Regarding BoJ, its functioning law was reviewed in 1997 with the purpose of 
insuring the independence of the central bank. The law reads that “The Bank of Japan’s 
autonomy regarding currency and monetary control shall be respected” To ensure the 
independence of the Bank, members of the Policy Board cannot be dismissed for 
holding opinions at difference with the government, and the government cannot order 
the Bank to undertake any particular policy action or to conduct any particular business 
operation. At the same time, it is important that the Bank’s monetary policy is 
consistent with the government’s basic economic policy framework. As a result, BoJ 
must “always maintain close contact with the government and exchange views 
sufficiently” The Bank of Japan Law also allows representatives of the government to 
attend Monetary Policy Meetings of the Policy Board (MPMs), to give their views and 
submit proposals, or request that the Board postpone a vote on monetary policy 
measures until the next meeting, but the government representatives have no votes in 
the monetary policy decisions. 
Between the three central banks there are several other differences in what con-
cerns exchange policy. In the United States, the exchange policy is the responsibility of 
the Department of the Treasury, unlike Japan where the currency interventions are 
legally the privilege of the Finance Ministry. In reality, BoJ undertakes this activity as 519 
government agent, but using government funds. In the Euro zone, article 111 of the 
Treaty offers the Governing Council the right to formulate “general orientations for the 
exchange rate”. At the same time, the Treaty stipulates that the purpose of price stability 
maintenance is respected in adopting the fixed exchange rate.  
 
Responsibility, transparency and communication 
In the early 80’s, the Fed leadership realized that inflation reduction and stability 
would be easier to achieve if the monetary authority had public credibility, moreover, 
the Fed officials considered good public communication as a useful instrument in 
credibility building. In the same direction, Woodward (2003) underlines the fact that 
transparency could help increase monetary policy efficiency. Still, it could create a 
potential conflict for the central banks: a maximum level of transparency could generate 
confusion. 
In order to consolidate its legitimacy, an independent central bank should answer 
before democratic institutions and the public for its actions, in order to accomplish its 
goals. The Union Treaty stipulates the elaboration of reports (for instance, ECB must 
draw up the Annual Report and present it before the European Parliament, the Union 
Commission and Council) and sets the obligation of periodic presentations to the 
European Parliament. 
Similar reporting procedures were set in the United States and Japan. Fed answers 
before the Congress, and the latter can modify the Federal Reserve Act at any time. Fed 
must report once a year to the spokesman of the House of Representatives and to 
announce twice a year the banking commission of the Congress about monetary policy. 
Also, Fed officials answer Congress questions at its request. 
BoJ has different obligations regarding compulsory public reports, as well as 
concerning its actions. Similar to Fed’s semi-annual report to the Congress, BoJ submits 
a report on currency and monetary control to the Diet twice a year, and the Governor or 
a designated representative appears before Diet committees, on request, to explain the 
Bank’s policies, business operations, and balance sheet conditions. Moreover, the BoJ 
Governor has periodic press conferences after monetary policy sessions in order to 
explain the monetary policy decisions adopted. 
Since the introduction of the new monetary policy framework, BoJ examines 
economic activity and prices from two perspectives: the first focuses on the economic 
forecasts and price expectations for one or two years ahead. The second perspective is 
more long-term oriented and takes into account those risks that are most relevant in 
monetary policy implementation. 
Transparency is a concept that is related to and still distinct from, responsibility. 
The transparency of monetary policy can be defined as the extent to which central 
banks offer information related to the monetary policy process. As Blinder (2004) 
points out, such information should be clear, have a backed content and be open to the 
public. According to the specialists, the limits of transparency vis-à-vis responsibility 
and communication are variable. Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) distinguish between five 
types of transparency, namely: 
¾  political transparency - refers to an open and clear presentation of monetary 
policy objectives  
¾  economic transparency - focuses on the economic information used in 
monetary policy  
¾  procedural transparency - reflects the way monetary policy decisions are 520 
taken and involves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the 
monetary policy framework  
¾  policy transparency - means that policy decisions should be promptly 
announced. Moreover, it includes an explanation of the decision, as well as a policy 
definition or indication of possible future actions 
¾  operational transparency -  concerns the implementation of the central bank’s 
policy actions. 
Concerning the Eurosystem, Winkler (2002) remarks different aspects of 
transparency that have been receiving special attention, including open communication, 
clarity and information efficiency. However, an effective communication must find the 
balance between: the open and complete presentation of the policy-making process, and 
simplifying the presentation of this process in the search of greater clarity. Blinder 
(2004) also observes that monetary policy decision-making cannot be carried out in a 
completely open manner. 
Following the above remarks, it can be said that, both the Eurosystem and the Fed 
place strong emphasis on ensuring the transparency of the decision-making process and 
the transparency of the analyses made by the responsible decision factors. 
In the case of ECB, the press conferences take place shortly after the monthly 
Governing Council meetings and the monetary policy decisions are publicly announced. 
Similarly, in the American practice, the FOMC announces monetary policy changes as 
soon as they are made. Also, in the case of Fed, the minutes of each meeting is 
published in maximum three weeks. 
The Bank of Japan Law requires the Bank to make clear to the public the meaning 
of its decisions, as well as its decision-making process. Following this stipulation, after 
each monetary policy meeting, the Policy Board makes public any decisions taken and 
explains money market operations. Like the Fed, BoJ publishes the minutes of the 
monetary policy meetings after approximately one month. Other matters discussed at 
the Policy Board meetings are presented in the Monthly Report of the BoJ’s Policy 
Board. 
It was discussed that the publication of minutes makes the Fed and the BoJ more 
transparent than ECB. Still, there are two main reasons determining ECB not to publish 
its minutes. Firstly, ECB intends to induce the public the idea that the entity which 
decides is not a person, or a group of people, but rather a college (a united team which 
benefits from its collegial spirit). Secondly, ECB does not want to give the false 
impression that it would represent the place where various national interests are 
sustained by national central banks governors. In fact, the Treaty clearly requires that 
decisions should be taken in the interest of the euro area as a whole, and thus any 
interpretation on the basis of a national vision is excluded. This makes the situation in 
the euro area somehow different from those of the United States and Japan. 
Nevertheless, ECB publishes its diagnosis-analysis in real-time, so that all the 
arguments that led to the decision should be completely presented to the public. Several 
recent studies have shown that ECB proves to be highly predictable in its decisions, a 
fact that represents one of the cardinal goals of transparency. 
 
Conclusions 
While the legal status and some of the presented systems duties may differ to some 
extent, there are still few distinctions regarding institutional structures, monetary policy 
framework, but also the objectives of monetary policy instruments.  521 
Table 1 
Eurosystem, Fed and BoJ comparison: leadership, monetary policy, independence 







(19 members): the ECB 
Executive Board (6 
members) and the 
governors of the 13 
central banks of the 
Eurosystem 
Federal “Open Market” 
Committee (FOMC), has 
12 
members: the Board of 
Governors (members), the 
President of the New 
York Fed and 4 other Fed 
banks presidents (on a 
rotating basis) 







Price stability is the 
primary objective. This 
is defined in exact 
quantitative terms. 
 
Multiple objectives: to 
promote maximum 
employment, stable prices 
and moderate long-term 
interest rates. 
Multiple objectives: 
price stability (now 
defined within a 
range) and the 
stability of the 
financial system. 
 
Independence  Yes Yes  Yes 
 
In the past years, central banks practices all over the world mainly evolved to a 
greater independence, transparency and monetary policy commission decision-making. 
These approaches contributed to the decrease of differences between the Eurosystem, 
the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Japan and it corresponds to a tendency that 
can be noticed at other central banks’ level. 
There are, however, some differences in the way monetary policy committees 
operate. For instance, when taking monetary policy decisions, both the Governing 
Council of ECB and the Board of Governors of Fed officially act by simple majority 
voting. In practice, both the Governing Council and the FOMC operate as collegial 
committees. In contrast, the Policy Board of BoJ operates in a much more 
individualistic manner than the other two committees. 
As emphasized in Table 2, there are some differences between the communication 
strategies, although financial markets’ receptiveness appears to be high for both the 
Eurosystem (regarding monetary policy tendencies) and Fed (concerning monetary 
policy tendencies and economic perspectives opinions). Unlike ECB and BoJ, Fed does 
not quantify its price stability goal and does not communicate a constant monetary 
policy. ECB does not publish the minutes of the Governing Council meetings, like Fed 
and BoJ do, but offers real-time information on interest rate decisions. The decision not 
to publish meetings’ minutes must be seen as a measure of prevention for possible 










The Eurosystem, Fed and  BoJ comparison: Responsibility, Strategies 










 Annual report to 
EU institutions and to 
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Parliament 






minutes following the 
FOMC meetings 
 Semi-annual reports 
before the Banking 
Commission of the 
Congress 
 Hearings before the 
Congress 
 Monthly Bulletin/ 
Report of the regional 











 Monthly Report of 
the Policy Board 
publishing; 
 Semi-annual report 








Approach focused on 
the information 








by the Eurosystem). 
 
Centralized (operations 
conducted by the New 




Regarding economic and financial of the past two decades, all three central banks 
have faced different problems, some of them with national characteristics (as is the case 
of Japan), others more global in nature. The general activity framework of the three 
banks differs from one system to the other, the euro zone being a heterogeneous area, 
but we can state that these differences have reduced in the past years. To conclude, we 
can affirm that the monetary policy of the Eurosystem, Fed and BoJ is oriented towards 
the same result - that is monetary stability, regardless of the instruments used or the 
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